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Abstract. Unmanned aircraft systems promise to be useful for a mul-
titude of applications such as cargo transport and disaster recovery. The
research on increased autonomous decision-making capabilities is there-
fore rapidly growing and advancing. However, the safe use, certification,
and airspace integration for unmanned aircraft in a broad fashion is still
unclear. Standards for development and verification of manned aircraft
are either only partially applicable or resulting safety and verification
efforts are unrealistic in practice due to the higher level of autonomy
required by unmanned aircraft. Machine learning techniques are hard to
interpret for a human and their outcome is strongly dependent on the
training data. This work presents the current certification practices in
unmanned aviation in the context of autonomy and artificial intelligence.
Specifically, the recently introduced categories of unmanned aircraft sys-
tems and the specific operation risk assessment are described, which
provide means for flight permission not solely focusing on the aircraft
but also incorporating the target operation. Exemplary, we show how
the specific operation risk assessment might be used as an enabler for
hard-to-certify techniques by taking the operation into account during
system design.
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1 Current State in Unmanned Aviation
In aerospace, safety considerations are one of the main concerns and cost drivers.
Only after certification of the aircraft, a participation in civil aviation is allowed.
In order to direct companies in the process of achieving certification and to
support certification authorities, several guidelines were presented.
The SAE1 Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP) and the RTCA2 DO
standards are prominent acceptable means of compliance. As shown in Figure 1,
1 Society of Automotive Engineers is a global associations, developing standards for
aerospace, automotive, and others.
2 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics is a private, not-for-profit association,
developing technical guidance.
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several guidelines exist for development processes and safety assessments, both
for the development phase and the operational phase. These standards impose
high requirements on development and verification, e.g. requirements on code
coverage increase with the criticality of a software item. The so-called MC/DC
metric, which is required for the most critical assurance level, is a significant
driver for costs of verification alone [5, 6]. The overall objective is to demonstrate
that the system under development is working correctly or, where this is not
possible, show the high quality of the development process.
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Fig. 1. Overview of aircraft development guidelines - How they complement each other.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are aircraft without a human pilot on
board but, instead, with an operator on the ground having some form of control
over it – rendering the UAS into a complex distributed system. Amazon3, DHL4,
as well as other companies investigate to deliver goods with the overall objective
to facilitate unmanned last-mile delivery.
An autonomous flight capable of contingency measurements in case of off-
nominal behavior is highly desirable for these operations. At best fully au-
tonomous, without an operator on-ground who is unfavorable for long-distance
deliveries. Although the aircraft is unmanned, it can still do harm on-ground
or in-air. We mentioned that certification of manned aircraft is cost intensive
and hard to achieve. For presented business cases to work, the main concern is
not anymore the performance of the autonomy functionalities – vision-based au-
tonomous flying system do exist and perform well – but instead the certification
of these functionalities [8]. A loss of reputation for these business cases could be
fatal. For instance, machine learning techniques like Convolutional Neural Net-
works allow to infer weights, given a loss function for the domain and enough
3 Amazon Prime Air, www.amazon.com/primeair
4 DHL Parcelcopter, http://www.dpdhl.com/parcelcopter
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training data. But, how can they be certified? As of yet, such nets are not ca-
pable of outputting in which situations they are working. Additionally, attacks
on machine learning with adversarial examples were presented which cause the
model to make mistakes by only changing a few pixels [11].
However, the achievements in machine learning or artificial intelligence (AI)
in general are undeniable and research on e.g. Bayes Deep Learning exist which
combine Bayesian approaches with deep learning to reason about the model con-
fidence [4]. Nonetheless, to our knowledge, these confidence values are similarly
dependent on the training data and, therefore, no general statement in which sit-
uations the trained nets work is possible. Therefore, a different question might
be: How can we embed these techniques within the overall system design to
enable certification?
In industry, a common architecture to facilitate hard-to-certify components
is to switch to a more conservative backup component in case of an hazardous
situation. For such an architecture, two main aspects are required. First, an al-
ternative conservative action has to exist. Second, the hazardous situation needs
to be detectable. Exemplary, in manned aviation the Brake-to-Vacate (BTV)
system by Airbus is a “convenience” function on top of the safety-critical Run-
way Overrun Prevention System (ROPS). The objective of BTV is to optimize
the path from the runway to the taxiway. The optimized path reduces the wear
on brakes and tires as well as the time the aircraft spends on the runway and,
therefore, increases the throughput of the airport. ROPS is a simpler function
than BTV which is directly integrated within BTV. It either warns the pilots if
the runway is insufficiently long before touchdown/deceleration or applies max-
imum braking when deceleration already started.
In late 2015, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) introduced the so
called specific category which allows to combine the reasoning of aircraft system
and target operation. In the next section, we present the new categories, an up-
coming guideline for the risk assessment, and the DLR project ALAADy. Then,
we discuss how these innovations can help to apply AI techniques. Specifically,
we argue how the system architecture and regulatory frameworks can interlock
to enable the use of hard-to-certify components. Finally, we give a future per-
spective.
2 Trends in Aerospace
EASA recently introduced three categories of UAS operation that use separate
sets of regulation, based on the intrinsic risks involved [2]. The three categories
are referred to as open, specific, and certified. The open category is reserved for
low risk operation of unmanned aircraft below 0.25 kg. This category requires
no or minimal regulation. The certified category is used for operations that are
of an equivalent level of risk comparable to manned aviation, therefore the same
level of rigor for development and verification is applied. The new specific cate-
gory allows a step-wise adaptation of regulation and certification requirements
between the open and certified categories. For flight permission, the specific cat-
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egory relies on a risk assessment to determine the required level of certification
requirements. As risk assessment, EASA recommends the so-called specific oper-
ation risk assessment (SORA) that is currently being developed by JARUS [7].
In contrast to the certified category, the specific category is not targeted solely
on the UAS, but towards the operation of a specific UAS in its entirety including
the mission, the environment, operation conditions, rigor during development as
well as operator, and pilot qualification. SORA is currently under development
and a first deployment by authorities is likely within years.
DLR (German Aerospace Center) is currently supporting the SORA devel-
opment by applying it to a cargo application within the project ALAADy (Auto-
mated Low Altitude Air Delivery) [1]. The mission consists in cargo delivery on
a range of around 600 km flying over sparsely populated areas. The unmanned
aircraft are intended to fly in very low level to circumvent most of the air traffic.
These efforts help to further research interdependencies of the SORA process
with UAS design and development, specifically DLR investigates the advantages
of the new specific category concept to maintain a safe operation. A controlled
termination of the UAS in safe areas is used to minimize the risk to third parties
on-ground or in the air and, thus, ultimately makes the operation safe. This is
necessary, since a backup pilot cannot be aboard the target aircraft which is in
contrast to autonomous cars. There, a backup driver supervises the system and
takes control in case of emergencies. In aviation, the use of Optional Piloted
Vehicle (OPV) during development is possible but the required components and
pilot might be too heavy for the real system [3].
One hope utilizing the specific category is to develop cheaper UAS with new
autonomous capabilities. DLR works on a system architecture that is leveraging
the containment of the risk of the operation. The goal is to use technologies that
are not usable in a traditional certification process for aerospace due to the high
requirements on verification objectives imposed by certification standards.
3 AI Applicability
The major innovation with the specific category and SORA is that it considers
not only the UAS but also factors the target operation in. Explicitly, manned
certification always assumes harm on people in case of an operation being out of
control. Therefore, a high confidence in the system is mandatory. SORA relieves
this burden by incorporating the risk to harm people on-ground or in-air. So
called harm and threat barriers need to be in place to achieve equally high
confidence with respect to the operation. This is a huge change because it allows
to fit the system design to the target operation. Already limitations to basic
operation parameters like daytime or flight altitude have significant impact on
the system design and its certification effort. An extreme example would be the
case of operations only involving flying in low-altitude in the desert at daytime:
for this no highly reliable ice protection system is required. Similar scenarios
can be easily found for many possible UAS operations in Europe. Additionally,
it allows to monitor the operation parameters instead of an explicit functionality.
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For instance, surveying crops by unmanned aircraft where limiting the airspace
to a pre-defined area, e.g. the field, reduces the risk of harming people on the
ground or in the air. There are two main capabilities: the monitoring (MC) and
the flight capability (FC). MC monitors the UAS and has the authority to ac-
tivate countermeasures or the flight termination whenever required to avoid a
breaking out of the pre-defined area. Regarding SORA, a certification of MC
plays the major role for flight certifiability since it prevents harm on-ground or
in-air, i.e. acts as harm barrier. Complementary, FC controls and manages the
UAS in an efficient and economic way such that all crops are sufficiently viewed.
Possibly, reacting upon environmental conditions and based on vision. Roughly
spoken, FC tries to achieve the highest performance whereas MC takes care that
no environmental/operation conditions are violated. There are different ways of
implementing such capabilities within a system each of them having different
advantages and disadvantages considering certification effort, cost, and perfor-
mance. In Figure 2, possible system designs are depicted and now discussed:
(a) Both capabilities are embedded in one software component running on a
dedicated hardware. Interaction-wise, this setup offers the closest interac-
tion between MC and FC due to no resource separation. However due to
certification efforts in conjunction with cost, applicable hardware is limited,
e.g. multi/many-core processors and multiprocessing. Software-wise, the per-
formance might suffer due to the hardware restrictions and certification is
also difficult due to no clear separation between MC and FC.
(b) Advantages and restrictions on hardware similarly remain. Limited com-
puting power prevent the usage of advanced algorithms. However, the clear
separation between MC and FC in software improves the certification efforts
software-wise. Still, there is a dependency between MC and FC. However,
the certification efforts for FC are reduced. Showing the absence of effects
on the hardware, i.e. the unobstrusiveness regarding MC, might suffice.
(c) MC and FC are running on dedicated hardware. This system design offers the
possibility to encapsulate the MC and FC into a certified component and an
uncertified component, respectively. It represents a sweet spot between flight
performance and certification efforts. Certification efforts should be focused
on MC where a trade-off in complexity is apparent. As a first step, simple
and conservative buffers within the pre-defined area facilitate geo-fencing,
i.e. preventing a break out. The certification of this approach is easier but
reduces the surveillance performance, i.e. the buffers prevent the access to
the complete area. The complexity can be increased from worst-case buffers
to more advanced techniques which incorporate the continuously changing
state of the UAS [9, 10]. Considering FC, dedicated, possibly uncertified,
hardware can be used. Further, algorithms can be applied which could not
be used so far. For instance, some of the most popular machine learning
techniques, like deep neural networks, show promising results but are hardly
human interpretable and therefore hard-to-certify.
Note that the discussed certification efforts can be addressed by the operation
itself. By incorporating a sufficiently large safety buffer around the operation
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Fig. 2. Possible system design. (a) Shared hardware and combined capability (b)
Shared hardware but separated capabilities (c) Dedicated hardware for each capability
which exceeds the physical limits of the aircraft, e.g. the lift-to-drag ratio com-
bined with fuel consumption, even MC turns out to be redundant.
Crop surveillance is just one example which indicates that SORA enables the
usage of previously inconceivable techniques by allowing to fit the system design
of the UAS to its specific intended operation. In general and especially for more
complex use cases, finding such a sweet spot between aircraft certification and
operational limitations is challenging but in any case worth looking at. Once suf-
ficient harm and threat barriers are established, it allows the usage of state of the
art algorithms for high performance within the respective operation. An obvious
use of AI for UAS is the detection of obstacles as well as conflicting traffic using
computer vision. This use case is similar to the task that is currently performed
by machine learning algorithms for autonomous cars. Furthermore, AI could be
used to categorize the real time UAS performance as normal or abnormal. Ma-
chine learning algorithms could learn from simulations, test runs, and actual test
flights during development as well as all operational in-service flights of all UAS
of a certain type or fleet. The certified/uncertified point of view might be not
applicable or too rigor in some cases. External safety frameworks enhancing AI,
e.g. runtime safety monitoring, or research advances towards certification of AI
in general, might soften the rigorous separation.
4 Future Perspective
Although the results of AI, in particular deep learning techniques, are very
promising, the use of such techniques in safety critical areas is problematic. The
aerospace domain imposes high requirements on the development and verifica-
tion of software systems. The certification of AI is currently only possible with
a thoroughly documented service history that can establish the necessary trust
or a switching architecture relying on detecting misbehavior. It is unclear how
existing coverage metrics, such as MC/DC, could be applied to neural networks
to assure functional safety. More research efforts regarding the verification and
validation aspects of these new AI techniques are therefore necessary.
However, the specific category approach introduced by EASA in combination
with the safe monitoring of the operation could be an enabling technology for
AI applications, even in a safety critical context. The specific category offers a
pragmatic way to gather service history experience with uncertified components,
exemplary depicted in Section 3. It is unlikely that a certification of these com-
ponents is possible with traditional means of compliance in the near future. Also,
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in applications like visual obstacle detection, it is hard to identify a misbehavior,
e.g. a human was falsely associated or not detected at all, therefore a traditional
safety switch to a conservative alternative cannot be used. The specific category
can uniquely support AI applications by monitoring the operation instead of the
correct system-level functionality. The safety monitor ensures that there is no
increased risk when using AI because a mitigation action, e.g. flight termination,
can be triggered as soon as the operation is detected to be out of control. Similar
to autonomous cars, where hundreds of test vehicles with human safety drivers
are currently performing thousands of service miles, the service history for UAS
could be supported by the specific category use cases. Of course, open questions
remain, such as the comparability of the specific category use case, how much
service hours are sufficient for safety, and how to ensure proper requirement cov-
erage. Future work will also be necessary on ensuring the safety of the operation
and possible mitigation strategies. Also, how AI techniques can be adjusted to
a specific operation, e.g. training for operation specific inputs.
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